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Abstract  The figurative painter accesses very complex 
levels of knowledge. To produce a painting requires, first, a 
deep analysis of the image of the reality and, afterwards, the 
study of the reconstruction of this reality. This is not about a 
process of copying, but a process of the comprehension of 
the concepts that appear in the representation. The drawing 
guides us in the process of the production of the surface and 
in the distribution of the colours that, after all, are the data 
with which the vision mechanism builds the visual reality. 
Knowing the colour and its behaviour have always been a 
requirement for the figurative painter. From that knowledge 
we can draw wider conclusions. 




Painters never have been too explicit and our 
pronouncements have been scarce and almost always 
oriented to give practical advices about our profession.  
But the figurative painter accesses very complex levels of 
knowledge. To produce a painting requires, first, a deep 
analysis of the image of the reality and, afterwards, the study 
of the reconstruction of this reality. This is not about a 
process of copying, but a process of the comprehension of 
the concepts that appear in the representation. The drawing 
guides us in the process of the production of the surface and 
in the distribution of the colours that, after all, are the data 
with which the vision mechanism builds the visual reality. 
Knowing the colour and its behaviour have always been a 
requirement for the figurative painter. From that knowledge 
we can draw wider conclusions.  
2. The Sensation of Colour 
The sense of colour is the result of a process which starts 
in the eye and finishes in the occipital lobe of the brain. This 
process, which allows us to see all that surrounds us, is the 
corresponding energy that normally is electromagnetic. 
Nonetheless, if we close our eyes and press the eyeball, we 
see little stars or blobs of colour. That is, we contribute 
sufficient energy to the organ of vision to unleash the visual 
process.  
What is the difference between the vision that we 
normally have about our environment and the one which is 
produced as a consequence of pressing the eyeball? We will 
have two different images: one of them, the one of our 
environment, is an image formed by the organized 
distribution of the visual data, and the other, which is the 
consequence of pressing the eyeball, is a disorganized 
distribution of the visual information from which we won’t 
draw any conclusion. 
We would say that the image that we obtain as a 
consequence of pressing the eyeball is an internal vision, that 
is to say, it is produced inside our body, and the other one is 
external, in other words, it is produced outside it. Now, the 
image of our environment is composed of colours. If we look 
at a photograph or a painting we will see that we can only 
find blotches of colour in them, that is to say that the things 
that are represented therein are only formed by colours. We 
know that colour is formed in the brain, therefore, if images 
are compound of colours and colours are formed in the brain, 
thus we must conclude that if the images are composed of 
colors and the colors are formed in the brain, we must 
conclude that both are internal images and, as a consequence, 
our vision of the world  is - lacking a better expression- an 
“autistic” process. The image that we have of things is a 
product of our mind, because colours don’t exist outside it. 
Consequently, what we consider our visual external 
environment is just a phenomenon generated inside our brain 
and we can be sure that it will not go out of it. 
Naturally, the rest of the senses behaves in the same way 
because they are localized in the same space we have created 
for vision. They are integrated in a single field since the 
things we see are the same as those we touch, smell, feel and 
hear. So it is not only vision that behaves as an autistic 
mechanism, but rather all the sensorial information processes 
in the same way.  
We can deduce, then, that the elaboration of reality in any 
of its levels is not a photographic process. There is no “real” 
reality, a reality which is platonic, alien to us and with a 
previous existence of which we obtain a copy, but rather any 
form of reality of which we are conscious has been 
elaborated by our mind.  
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Man, then, cannot consider his exterior as something 
different from himself. The self is formed by all the 
conscious reality that the mind is capable of creating. This 
includes both the body and the entire universe that surrounds 
it. The self is not a physical being isolated from its 
environment, nor is it a supposed immaterial entity, that deep 
self we call spirit, but rather it is composed of whatever the 
mind is capable of creating.  
We do not have access to any form of consciousness 
before it is elaborated by the corresponding mental 
mechanism. Any form of consciousness comes determined 
by the mental mechanisms that generate it. And although we 
can suppose that  something must exist at the edge of our 
perception, we will never be able to know how much we 
know about its real nature.  
A sensation cannot be called “sensation” until it reaches  
consciousness. We cannot determine the existence of a 
colour until we can be conscious of it. We can investigate 
physiologically the formation of the sensation or find out in 
which zone of the brain it is elaborated, but we cannot be 
conscious of a sensation outside our consciousness, since it is 
not possible to be conscious of someone else’s 
consciousness.  
My consciousness – which is the only one that exists – is 
only conscious of two things: sensations and concepts – 
ideas. Sensations have a determined characteristic: we 
cannot describe them. Sensation is a discrete act of 
consciousness.  Let us see, as a example, what happens with 
colours. We can describe colour as an abstract element, but 
colour as a sensation is indefinable and inexplicable. What is 
the colour red? How would we explain to a person born blind 
the sensation of red? We would feel the same powerlessness 
if we had to explain sound to a deaf person.  
We know that a definition explains the elements that form 
the whole of what we intend to describe. And this demands 
that the component elements exist before the whole of the 
thing. If not, it would be possible that the whole would exist 
without one of its parts. When something cannot be 
described, it means either that it doesn’t exist or that its 
existence doesn’t depend on its component elements, but 
rather that it emerges directly from consciousness. The latter 
is what happens with sensations. We cannot define red, or 
any other colour, because nothing exists at the level of 
consciousness previous to it. The essential difference 
between sensation and concept is that a concept can be 
defined while sensations cannot.  
In the process of constitution of concepts, there is an 
important issue: the qualitative step from sensation to 
something which we can designate as “simple concept”. By 
way of illustration: a surface is a simple concept since it is 
the “sum” of sensations, which are the result of a “sum” of 
concepts. I think that the act of addition, or perhaps we must 
call it integration, depends on an innate faculty and the step 
from sensation to concept depends on this capacity. A 
sensation, by itself, does not offer more data than its own self. 
In other words, the assistance of some mechanism that 
integrates the sensations in more complex products is 
necessary. In this way, the visual data – colour stains- are 
organized in visual surfaces.  
Therefore we need this integrating mechanism to define a 
simple concept since it depends on two factors that existed 
previously: the sensation and the faculty of integration.  
We will define, then, a surface as the sum of organized and 
discrete sensations, and this definition can be applied to both 
the tactile concept and the visual concept of surface.  
It is true that we have created a mental mechanism capable 
of integration, whether it be this or a similar one.  This 
mechanism must exist since we, as painters, have used it to 
create tridimensional visual elements using bidimensional 
surfaces. And we use this mechanism in both  senses: we 
can disintegrate the surface into colours and, afterwards, 
restore it again. If we observe an object and we break it into 
colour stains, we can see that, at the beginning, we can keep 
the vision of the object, but if we carry on the process, at a 
certain point we will perceive it so separately that the object 
will disappear – not only the vision of the object, but the 
vision of its surface – any surface. In other words, we will 
invert the process of formation of the surface. When, over a 
bidimensional surface, the painter distributes the colours and 
creates visual tridimensional forms (which, at a tactile level 
is still bidimensional), he is manipulating the elements that 
forms the image to build surfaces at his own whim. So much 
so that the painter can “see” whatever surfaces he wants and 
orient it in the space as he wants. He can also visually 
convert the originally bidimensional surface into a 
tridimensional one. That is to say, he sees in the painting the 
surface of the object that he wants to represent that, deep 
down, can be anything.  
So we can consider that the concept of surface is universal. 
On a visual level, surfaces of different natures do not exist: 
the surface of the canvas, visually, can be converted into a 
hand, a loop or a bracelet. The only category of the visual 
surface is form. Because not even colour can be considered 
as an attribute of surface. With colour we can create surfaces, 
but surfaces of only one colour do not exist, because to build 
a visual surface it is necessary to integrate different colours. 
This is the discovery of Velázquez: the reality is composed 
of many discrete colour stains and, if they fit together 
correctly, we can create automatically the surface of the 
object we want to represent. In the illustration of  fig. 1, the 
viewer can choose to see the objects as such, or to perceive 
the blotches that form them. It is easy to observe the colours 
that configure the red loop and see them as isolated stains, 
but, when colours are perceived separately, we lose the 
complete vision and the object.  
This fact warns us how the mind creates its environment 
unconsciously since, given an order of colours, the 
corresponding surface is automatically generated.We can, 
then, consider this integrational ability as an innate 
mechanism capable of organizing  sensations and 
elaborating new forms of consciousness without manifest 
intervention of our will. Each sensorial mechanism follows 
its own procedure and goes by its own rules. In vision, the 
answer is relative because it is not directly proportional to the 
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stimulus.  This is in contrast to sound;a Do always sounds as 
such, whether it sounds before or after a Re o a Mi. On the 
other hand, the amount of sound has a relative behaviour: if 
we come out of an extremely noisy  locale, the noise of the 
street, which seemed to exceptionally loud  to us before, 
will seem agreeable now. 
 
Figure 1.  Velázquez, “Mariana de Austria”, Museo del Prado, (fragment) 
With colour, over different fields, the same stimulus 
generates different responses. That is to say that the same 
pigment can be seen in different colours. The two frames of 
fig. 2 have been done with the same pigment of the colour’s 
RGB selector: red 100, green 60, blue 20, of the computer 
program “GraphicConverter”.  However, their colour is 
different and will vary again over any other background. It is 
the same with the greys range of the aforementioned 
software.  
 
Figure 2.  A. Carroggio,  drawing with computer 
The same thing happens on the grey scale of fig. 3; the 
interior “frames” are the same grey from the grey scale of the 
aforementioned program. 
We cannot assume that there exists a perfect background 
in which the colour produced in its interior would be the 
“correct” colour. Therefore, we would wonder: which is the 
authentic colour? Which, among the two interior colours that 
we can see in the sample illustrations, are the colour that we 
should see? We must conclude that colour is not the pigment, 
nor the amount or quality of the energy that trigger the visual 
process. Colour is what we see or, in other words, the 
response of the mechanism. This response depends both on 
the visual field and on the particular conditions in which the 
visual phenomenon is produced. Among these conditions we 
can even find our state of mind, which will have an effect on 
the response of the mechanism.  
 
Figure. 3  A. Carroggio, drawing with computer 
We can measure, then, the intensity of light, its frequency 
or its temperature. We also can analyze the composition of 
pigments. However, the response –colour- is only 
measurable by the individual that perceives it as a pure act of 
consciousness.  
We must conclude that reality, in any of its aspects, 
depends on the mental mechanisms by which is created, and 
its characteristics are determined by the categories of these 
mechanisms. We will exemplify it by following these 
principles: 
We know the difficulties that we find when we try to 
define “time”. If it were a concept we would be able to define 
it. That would mean that it is formed by elements with a 
previous existence. In other words, something that had 
existed before time, which would be contradictory. And 
since we said that our brain is only conscious of two products 
– sensations and concepts- we must consider it as a sensation 
and, in  fact, it behaves like a sensation. Our perception of 
time is relative because, like colour, it depends on the mental 
mechanism that creates it. Basically, it depends, as we all 
know, on our state of mind. Watches give a conventional 
measure of time, but that does not mean that they can 
measure the real value of time. To aspire to an absolute 
measure of time is the same as trying to obtain an absolute 
measure of colour.  
3. Conclusions 
Since, as well as color, time is just a sensation and it does 
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not exist outside our minds, it would be absurd to assign 
measurable values to it, same way as it would be illogical to 
apply values to color. Therefore, we cannot either consider 
velocity and space as measurable parameters outside our 
conscience.  
Scientists and artists, as spectators of a phenomenon –any 
phenomenon- achieve, ultimately, the same product. After 
all, their ways to understand their environment must 
converge because its mental mechanisms are the same.  
The figurative painter knows he cannot try to represent 
objects, since objects are indefinable in a physical reality 
level. He must accept that the only way is to represent a 
completely subjective image. Solipsism is a normal state for 
the figurative painter, as he knows that the image he sees is 
exclusively made up of colors - the colors which he created - 
and that his only function is know how to distribute those 
colors in a canvas. This is actually the only thing painters can 
do, since they do not have any other tools.  
This approach may compel us to reconsider our 
knowledge about the Universe and can make us differentiate 
between the known universe – the interior universe- and the 
exterior universe, and find out which knowledge belongs to 
one or another.  
The truth is solipsism is nowadays philosophically 
discredited, and is a very uncomfortable trend, specially for 
science. Nevertheless, the former exposition demonstrates 
that, at a physiological level, we need to change the vision of 
our field of knowledge. We have to ask ourselves: ¿How sure 
we can be about whether the equations of the scientists 
describe Universe’s behavior or are just a display of their 
intellect’s capacities?  
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